Author Archives: Nic Koziolek

Priority in account – in the philosophy of perception

One thing that’s become increasingly important to my thinking is the idea of priority in account. As I think of it, the basic idea is just this. In any theory (including any philosophical theory), some terms will be defined in terms … Continue reading

Posted in Perception, Philosophical Methodology

The “transparency” of experience

In the first part of The Mind’s Construction, Matthew Soteriou spends a lot of time talking about a famous passage of G.E. Moore’s “The Refutation of Idealism,” in which Moore says: “The moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness … Continue reading

Posted in Self-consciousness

Self-conscious knowledge and the KK principle

When I first read Timothy Williamson’s Knowledge and Its Limits, one thing that struck me, and stuck with me, was the fact that, while Williamson rejects the KK principle: KK: If you know that p, then you know that you know that p, … Continue reading

Posted in Self-consciousness

A question about “intuitions”

In a paper just published online in Erkenntnis, “Intuition Talk is Not Methodologically Cheap: Empirically Testing the ‘Received Wisdom’ About Armchair Philosophy,” Zoe Ashton and Moti Mizrahi mention the following note by Anscombe as an example of an appeal to intuition: … Continue reading

Posted in Philosophical Methodology

Consciousness and Self-Consciousness

Here’s something that’s been bugging me for a while: when philosophers characterize conscious mental states, they often do so in terms that seem to imply that those states are self-conscious. In other words, they seem to be conflating consciousness and self-consciousness; assuming, … Continue reading

Posted in Philosophical Methodology, Self-consciousness

Self-Consciousness and the Taking Condition

It’s possible that, in my earlier posts (here and here), I run two distinct things together: (i) the “takings” posited by the Taking Condition and (ii) the belief (in the best case, the knowledge)––acquired in any self-conscious inference––that you’ve come to know … Continue reading

Posted in Inference, Self-consciousness

Kant on Self-Consciousness

At one point in “Some Remarks on Kant’s Theory of Experience,” Sellars is summarizing some “familiar Kantian theses” (279), and says: “Even our consciousness of what is going on in our own mind is a conceptual response which must be distinguished from … Continue reading

Posted in Self-consciousness | Tagged , ,

How do you know that your premises support your conclusion?

I suggested in an earlier post that any theory of inference needs to be able to distinguish between inferences of the following two forms: (1) q; r; therefore, p (2) q; r; <q> and <r> support <p>; therefore, p. Intuitively, the difference is that, in order to perform … Continue reading

Posted in Inference

About this blog

I’ve been meaning for years to start blogging about philosophy, mainly with the idea that it would provide me with an outlet for the kinds of small thoughts, ideas, and questions that arise on a weekly basis. So that’s what this … Continue reading

Posted in Uncategorized

Knowing that your premises support your conclusion

My account of inference (see “Inferring as a Way of Knowing”) involves rejecting the view that, when you infer, you come to believe your conclusion in part because you take your premises to support it. In other words, it involves rejecting the … Continue reading

Posted in Inference | 7 Comments