Category Archives: Inference

Self-Consciousness and the Taking Condition

It’s possible that, in my earlier posts (here and here), I run two distinct things together: (i) the “takings” posited by the Taking Condition and (ii) the belief (in the best case, the knowledge)––acquired in any self-conscious inference––that you’ve come to know … Continue reading

Posted in Inference, Self-consciousness

How do you know that your premises support your conclusion?

I suggested in an earlier post that any theory of inference needs to be able to distinguish between inferences of the following two forms: (1) q; r; therefore, p (2) q; r; <q> and <r> support <p>; therefore, p. Intuitively, the difference is that, in order to perform … Continue reading

Posted in Inference

Knowing that your premises support your conclusion

My account of inference (see “Inferring as a Way of Knowing”) involves rejecting the view that, when you infer, you come to believe your conclusion in part because you take your premises to support it. In other words, it involves rejecting the … Continue reading

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